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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
ELI PATRICK ARCHULETTA, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 890168-CA 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is established 
by 78-2a-3(f), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a Judgment, Conviction, and 
Sentence following a jury trial in which the Defendant-Appellant 
was convicted of attempted aggravated arson, a Second-Degree 
Felony and injury to a jail, a Third-Degree Felony. The 
Defendant-Appellant•s conviction -of a Thirds-Degree Felony, injury 
to a jail is not being contested. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Was there sufficient evidence to convict the Defendant 
of attempted arson, or should the allegations leading to arson 
relate solely to the injury to a jail? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, OR BULES. 
The statut .e which is believed to be determinative in 
this matter is 76-6-101, 76-6-102, and 76-6-103, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended. This statute are reproduced in 
total as the addendum to this brief. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a Judgment, Sentence, and 
Commitment from the Fifth Judicial Court of Iron County, State of 
Utah, following a jury trial in which the Defendant was convicted 
of a Second-Degree Felony on the offense of attempted aggravated 
arson and a Third-Degree Felony offense of injury to a jail. The 
Defendant was sentenced to serve a single sentence of one to 
fifteen years on the attempted aggravated arson charge. The 
sentencing on the injury to a jail charge was stayed. 
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Trial in this matter was held in the District Court of 
Iron County, State of Utah, on December 7, 1988. Following the 
Defendant's conviction, a pre-sentence report was prepared and 
the Defendant was sentenced to a single term of one to fifteen 
years on the Second-Degree Felony conviction. The trial court 
stayed the imposition of sentence on the Third-Degree Felony 
conviction of injury to a jail. The Defendant had earlier been 
coimitted as an inmate to the Utah State Prison, and he is 
presently serving his previous sentence, with the sentence in 
this matter to be served consecutively following the previous 
sentence. 
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DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT 
The Defendant was sentenced to serve one to fifteen 
years at the Utah State Prison on the Second-Degree Felony 
offense of attempted aggravated arson to run consecutively with 
the previous sentences that he was serving. 
STATEMENT OF "FACTS 
On May 31, 1988, the Defendant was housed in the State 
Prisoner section of the Iron County/Utah State Correctional 
Facility located in Cedar City, Utah. (T.33-34) The Defendant 
was a prisoner in the custody of the Utah State Division of 
Corrections and was previously committed to the Utah State 
Prison- (T.26) On May 31, 1988, the Defendant had been 
threatened by other inmates in the facility (T.123-124) and had 
requested that the facility's personnel move him to a more secure 
location within the facility. (T.125) The facility personnel 
denied that request. (T.125) When making a check of the facility 
late that evening, two correctional officers found a window 
broken out of the steel door leading to the Defendant's cell 
(T.71) and observed the Defendant inside his cell with a lighted 
match near a pile of papers stacked in the corner of the bed 
within the cell. (T.72) The mattress on the steel bunk had been 
pulled back so that the papers were resting on the steel bunk in 
the corner against a painted cinder block wall.- (T.53-54) The 
Defendant then lit the papers with the match causing a fire in 
the corner of th§ cell. (T.72) Other damage had been done to the 
cell in that a water faucet had been broken off a fixture in the 
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cell and the window had been broken out. (T.128) The metcil 
mirrors within the cell had also been dented. The testimony 
relating to the fire damages is found on pages 103 and 104 of the 
trial transcript. Mr. Lyle Glover, custodial for the facility, 
stated, "Fire damage on the paint—to the paint. Where he has 
started the fire on the bunk and burned a corner of the 
cell." (T.103-104) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
There was insufficient evidence to support the 
conviction of attempted aggravated arson, a Second-Degree Felony, 
for the reason that the Defendant's action of lighting a fire on 
a steel bunk against a painted cinder block wall was not conduct 
sufficient to support the kind of damage required under the arson 
statute. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
CONVICTION OF A SECOND-DEGREE FELONY OF ATTEMPTED AGGRAVATED 
ARSON IN ADDITION TO THE INJURY TO A JAIL OF WHICH THE DEFENDANT 
WAS CONVICTED. 
In order to convict the Defendant of attempted aggravated 
arson, the State of Utah was required to have shown that the 
Defendant attempted by means of fire to damage a habitable 
structure, ie. the Iron County/Utah State Correctional Facility. 
Pursuant to the holding in State v. Breckenridge, 688 P. 2d 400 
(Utah, 1984) the State was required to show that the Defendant 
attempted to intentionally damage the property of another, in 
this case being the Correctional Facility. The evidence in the 
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case shows that the fire was lit on a steel bunk against a 
painted cinder block wall which was supporting a concrete 
ceiling. Upon the provisions of 76-2-304 ignorance or mistake of 
fact which disproves the- culpable mental state is a defense to 
any prosecution for a crime. It is the Defendant-Appellant's 
position that the mistake of fact, if there was any such mistake, 
would be at that the steel bunk, the block wall, and the ceiling 
were in fact flammable. It is this Appellant's assertion that 
the evidence in this case is not sufficient at a matter of law to 
support a conviction of attempted aggravated arson. The burning 
of paint affixed to a steel bunk, a cinder block wall, or a 
concrete ceiling does not constitute the type of "damage" 
required under 76-6-103, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
It is the Appellant's position that he did not mistake the fact 
that the bunk, wall, and ceiling were not flammable but that the 
fire was lit in order- to be -a contained -blaze -because of its 
location in the corner of the steel bunk after the mattress had 
been rolled back. 
The Defendant respectfully requests this Court to 
overturn his conviction of attempted aggravated arson and to 
dismiss that count in the information. 
Since the Defendant has been tried, and since the 
evidence is wholly insufficient as as matter of law to 
support a conviction, if follows that the information 
must be dismissed and the defendant discharged. Double 
jeopardy bars the retrial of a defendant when an 
appellant court declares the evidence to be 
insufficient to sustain a conviction. State v. Webb 
113 Utah Adv, Rep. 23, (Utah .. Supreme ~ Court July 
21,1989). 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons cited above, the Defendant requests that 
the conviction of attempted aggravated arson be reversed and that 
that count of the information be dismissed. 
DATED this 
/ > 
7 L 
day of August, 1989. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to Mr, Paul Van 
Dam, Utah Attorney General, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84114, this 
postage fully prepaid. 7 
day of August, 1989, first class 
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01. Definit ions. 
purposes of this chapter: 
(1) "Property" means any form of real property 
r tangible personal property which is capable of 
eing damaged or destroyed and includes a habit-
ble structure. 
(2) "Habitable structure" means any building, 
ehicle, trailer, railway car, aircraft, or water-
raft used for lodging or assembling persons or 
onducting business whether a person is actually 
resent or not. 
(3) "Property" is that of another, if anyone 
ther than the actor has a possessory or propri-
tary interest in any portion thereof. 
(4) "Value" means: 
(a) The market value of the property, if 
totally destroyed, at the time and place of 
the offense, or where cost of replacement ex-
ceeds the market value; or 
(b) Where the market value cannot he as-
certained, the cost of repairing or replacing 
the property within a reasonable time fol-
lowing the offense. 
(c) If the property damaged has a value 
that cannot be ascertained by the criteria set 
forth in Subsections (a) and (b) above, the 
property shall be deemed to have a value not 
to exceed $50. 1974 
-102. Arson . 
) A person is guilty of arson if, under circum-
ces not amounting to aggravated arson, by means 
re or explosives, he unlawfully and intentionally 
ages: 
(a) any property with intention of defrauding 
an insurer; or 
(b) the property of another. 
(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a felony of the 
second degree. A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is a 
felony of the second degree if the damage caused ex-
ceeds $5,000 value; a class A misdemeanor if the 
damage exceeds $1,000 but is not more than $5,000 
value; a class B misdemeanor if the damage caused 
exceeds $250 but is not more than $1,000 value; any 
other violation is a class C misdemeanor. 1986 
76-6-103. Aggrava ted a r son . 
( D A person is guilty of aggravated arson if by 
means of fire or explosives he intentionally and un-
lawfully damages: 
(a) a habitable structure; or 
(b) any structure or vehicle when any person 
not a participant in the offense is in the structure 
or vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated arson is a felony of the first degree. 
1986 
76-6-104. Reckless bu rn ing . 
( D A person is guilty of reckless burning if he: 
(a) Recklessly starts a fire or causes an explo-
sion which endangers human life; or 
(b) Having started a fire, whether recklessly 
or not, and knowing that it is spreading and will 
endanger the life or property of another, either 
fails to take reasonable measures to put out or 
control the fire or fails to give a prompt fire 
alarm; or 
(c) Damages the property of another by reck-
less use of fire or causing an explosion. 
(2) A violation of Subsections (a) and (b) is a class 
A misdemeanor. A violation of Subsection (c) is a 
class A misdemeanor if damage to property exceeds 
$1,000 value; a class B misdemeanor if the damage to 
property exceeds $500 value; and a class C misde-
meanor if the damage to property exceeds $50 value. 
Any other violation under Subsection (c) shall consti-
tute an infraction. 1973 
76-6-105. Causing a catastrophe. 
(1) Any person who by explosion, fire, flood, ava-
lanche, collapse of a building, release of poison gas, 
radioactive material, or other harmful or destructive 
force or substance, or by any other means, causes a 
wide-spread injury or damage to persons or property 
is guilty of causing a catastrophe. 
(2) Causing a catastrophe is a felony of the second 
degree if the person causes it knowingly and a class A 
misdemeanor if caused recklessly. WTA 
76-6-106. Criminal mischief. 
< 1 > A person commits criminal mischief if: 
(a) Under circumstances not amounting to 
arson, he damages or destroys property with the 
intention of defrauding an insurer: or 
(b) He intentionally and unlawfully tampers 
with the property of another and thereby: 
(i) Recklessly endangers human life; or 
(ii) Recklessly causes or threatens a sub-
stantial interruption or impairment of any-
public utility service; or 
(c) He intentionally damages, defaces, or de-
stroys the property of another. 
(d) He recklessly or willfully shoots or propels 
a missile or other object at or against a motor 
vehicle, bus, airplane, boat, locomotive, train 
railway car or caboose, whether moving or stand 
ing. 
(2) (a) A violation of Section 76-6-106(l)(a) is a fel 
ony of the third degree. 
Addendum^- Page 1 of 1 
